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Trade policy changes are likely to result in a reallocation of resources across sectors and 
space. Over the past two decades, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay have 
implemented unilateral trade liberalization programs and formed a regional bloc, 
Mercosur. The effects of these reforms on production structures in these countries have  
not received a great deal of attention. Have patterns of manufacturing concentration 
changed? What are their main determinants? This paper analyses relative manufacturing 
concentration patterns in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay over the period 1985-1998. The   
econometric evidence indicates that localization of demand and comparative advantages  
are the main driving forces of these patterns. The establishment of Mercosur seems to 
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1. INTRODUCTION       
Over the past two decades, South American countries have implemented broad unilateral trade 
liberalization programs. They have also actively engaged in regional trade initiatives. In particular, 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay signed a trade agreement in 1991, establishing  Mercosur 
(Mercado Común del Sur). The consequent reduction of trade costs and markets expansion are likely 
to result in changes in the geographical distribution of specific economic activities and the existing 
spatial equilibrium. This raises the question whether and to what extent have patterns of economic 
activity concentration changed in the above countries following these trade policy changes. This 
question is important and policy relevant for at least three reasons.   
First, the spatial distribution of economic activities has significant welfare implications. The way 
activities are organized across space affects the overall welfare an area can generate. The spatial 
distribution of activities also affects the geographical distribution of overall welfare (Ottaviano, 2002). 
Thus, by altering the locational pattern of economic activities, trade liberalization may promote 
changes in both the overall level of welfare and its distribution over space. 
Second, as a consequence of the previous point, the spatial distribution of economic activities has 
important political economy implications. Economic integration may trigger a relocation of economic 
resources at the aggregate level. As a result, economic activity might become concentrated in a few 
regions. In such a case, immobile agents in the region experiencing delocation suffer both as 
consumers and as workers. As consumers, they suffer because the diversity of nearby goods and 
services decreases and, given the existence of trade costs, they must pay higher effective prices for 
those goods whose production is relocated to other regions. As workers, they suffer due to the fact 
that the matching process between workers and firms tends to worsen, so that unemployment spells 
rise (Martin, 2000). The implied level of interregional disparities may become politically unacceptable 
and might hurt the viability of the economic integration process (Martin and Rogers, 1994; Begg, 
Judgin, and Morris, 1996). This is especially true if low spatial labour mobility prevails and affected 
workers have a relatively large weight in government’s objective function.  
Third, the spatial distribution of economic activities has significant macroeconomic implications. 
Increased geographical concentration and thus inter-industry specialization imply diverging production 
structures across involved countries and consequently a higher probability of experiencing asymmetric   
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shocks and a lower synchronization of business cycles (Kenen, 1969). Under such conditions, a 
greater bilateral exchange rate variability might be expected. This, in turn, might act as a channel of 
agglomeration of economic activities in the larger country within the bloc (Ricci, 1998) and might 
promote reversions in the integration process in the form of reinsertion of protectionist measures 
(Eichengreen, 1993; Fernández-Arias, Panizza, and Stein, 2002). 
To date, empirical work on spatial patterns of economic activities in Mercosur is scarce. In particular, 
to our knowledge, there is no empirical evidence on manufacturing location patterns within the area 
constituted by Mercosur countries and how they have changed after the creation of this trade bloc.     
This paper aims at filling this gap. First, using data for 1985-1998, we identify and discuss patterns of 
manufacturing concentration in three Mercosur countries, namely, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay.
2 
Second, we uncover underlying determinants of these patterns on the basis of an econometric 
analysis suggested by existing international trade theories. More precisely, we address the following 
questions: How concentrated/dispersed are manufacturing activities? Have patterns of manufacturing 
concentration changed? What are the determinants of manufacturing concentration patterns? Did the 
establishment of Mercosur make a difference in the spatial distribution of manufacturing? 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant theoretical 
literature with the purpose of formulating the set of hypotheses to be tested empirically. Section 3 
presents the data set and the concentration measure we use in this paper and discusses the cross-
sectional and time dimensions of concentration patterns. Section 4 discusses estimation results from 
our econometric analysis that aims at identifying the determinants of relative concentration patterns. 
The explanatory variables are suggested by international trade theory. The econometric evidence 
indicates that localization of demand and comparative advantages are the main driving forces of 
observed relative manufacturing concentration patterns. Moreover, the formation of Mercosur seems 
to matter for the location of manufacturing in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. Section 5 concludes. 
 
                                                 
2 Paraguay could not be included in the analysis due to missing data.    
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2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The factors explaining cross-sectional locational diversity and its dynamics can be classified into two 
broad groups: first nature elements, i.e., the physical geography and endowment of natural resources; 
and second nature elements, i.e., the geography of distance between economic agents (Krugman, 
1993; Overman, Redding, and Venables, 2001). Relevant theoretical approaches can be differentiated 
depending on the weight they assign to the aforementioned factors. The traditional trade theory   
emphasizes the role of the first group of factors. The new trade theory builds upon a combination of 
both. Finally, the new economic geography concentrates on the second group of factors.  
Patterns of economic activity location are frequently characterized in terms of their degree of 
concentration. One can distinguish between absolute concentration and relative concentration. One 
industry is absolutely concentrated if a few countries, independently of their sizes, account for very 
large shares of its overall activity (Midelfart-Knarvik, Overman, Redding, and Venables, 2000). In turn, 
one industry is relatively concentrated if the spatial pattern of its activity differs from the average 
spread of the total manufacturing activity across countries. Theoretical approaches can also be 
distinguished in terms of the predictions they yield. The traditional trade theory permits us essentially 
to derive clear-cut predictions about relative concentration but not for absolute concentration. The 
opposite is true for the new economic geography. Finally, the new trade theory makes possible 
drawing inferences about relative as well as absolute concentration (Haaland, Kind, Midelfart-Knarvik, 
and Torstensson, 1999). 
This section reviews the assumptions and predictions of these theoretical approaches with the aim of 
identifying testable hypotheses for the empirical analysis carried out in the following sections.  
 
2.1 The Traditional Trade Theory 
The traditional trade theory assumes perfect competition, product homogeneity and constant returns to 
scale, and shows that location is exogenously determined by first nature factors, namely, the spatial 
distribution of technologies (Ricardo, 1817), natural resources, and productive factors (Heckscher, 
1919; Ohlin, 1933).  
In the Ricardian model, locational patterns are basically driven by relative differences in technology, 
observed as differences in relative labour productivity and, hence, as differences in relative production   
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costs termed “comparative advantages”. The higher the  relative technology differences across 
countries, the higher the degree of relative concentration of industries.  
In the Heckscher-Ohlin model, the locational patterns are essentially determined by the interaction 
between country and industry characteristics (Venables, 2000). In the absence of underlying 
differences between countries in the world, firms producing in places in which they coexist with many 
partners face more intense competition both in product and in factor markets. Therefore, their 
profitability is lower than that of firms coexisting with less firms and facing less intense competition 
(Ottavino and Puga, 1997). Thus, the result is dispersion: economic activities distribute uniformly 
across the space. However, if countries display pronounced differences in their inherent 
characteristics, i.e., a lumpy distribution of factor endowments prevails, then a more uneven spatial 
distribution of production emerges. Activities concentrate relatively in those countries with a matching 
comparative advantage, i.e., which are relatively abundant in the factors they use intensively.   
In this context, the spatial distribution of demand is essentially relevant for trade patterns, but not for 
locational patterns, unless trade costs are positive. In particular, if such costs are prohibitive, then the 
geographical configuration of industries mirrors that of demand (Brülhart, 2001).  
What is the expected impact of trade liberalization on the location of economic activities? The 
traditional trade theory predicts that a general opening induces activities to relatively concentrate in 
countries with matching comparative advantages (Brülhart, 1998). This implies increased or 
decreased relative concentration depending on the spatial pattern of demand. If demand is more 
evenly spread over space than endowments, then the elimination of trade barriers will be associated 
with higher relative concentration and vice versa. In the case of a regional integration process, the 
influence of comparative advantages on the spatial dynamics has a specific aspect. In particular, the 
launching of a trade agreement among developing countries with different comparative disadvantages 
relative to the rest of the world, which consists of a preferential reduction in tariffs would induce a 
relocation of manufacturing to the country that, even though it may have a comparative disadvantage 
relative to the world, has a comparative advantage within the newly created regional economic space, 
so that consumers in the integrating countries would be increasingly supplied with manufactures from 
that country (Venables, 1999, 2000).    
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Although relevant, comparative advantage is not sufficient to explain the high concentration of 
economic activity observed in reality (Ottaviano and Puga, 1997). In particular, there are many regions 
without obvious natural advantages which develop into economic centres (Krugman, 1998). Which 
other factors can then explain the existing locational patterns? The new trade theory makes an 
important contribution in this sense.  
 
2.2 The New Trade Theory 
The new trade theory combines one first nature element, the market dimension, determined by the 
size of the workforce living in a particular country and the assumption of international labour 
immobility, and second nature elements, namely, the geographic distance between economic agents. 
In general, new trade models assume that the world consists of a big central country and a small 
peripheral country. The absolute factor endowment is larger in the central country but both countries 
have the same relative endowment.
3 In addition, these models assume that the production structure 
consists of two sectors: a perfectly competitive sector, which operates under constant returns to scale 
and whose output is costlessly traded, and a monopolistically competitive sector with firms producing 
differentiated products under increasing returns to scale, which are traded at a positive cost.  
The typical result of such models is that increasing returns sectors concentrate in locations with better 
access to the markets of their respective products. This result derives from the interaction between 
scale economies and trade costs as follows. Under economies of scale, average costs fall as the level 
of production rises. Thus, producers have an incentive to spatially concentrate their activitiesso as to 
operate at a more efficient level. The presence of trade costs, in turn, induces firms to locate in the 
country with the larger market for their respective goods, since in this way they can avoid such costs 
on a larger fraction of their sales.  
In summary, other things being equal, industries tend to be more relatively concentrated, the more 
relatively concentrated the demand for the goods they produce. Furthermore, a higher degree of scale 
                                                 
3 Thus, there are no comparative advantages.   
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economies is associated with higher absolute levels of spatial concentration. However, the theoretical 
prediction concerning the influence of increasing returns on relative concentration is ambiguous.
4  
The locational consequences of falling trade costs hinge upon the interplay between market size and 
factor market considerations. Krugman (1980) and Krugman and Helpman (1985) find that, other 
things equal, as trade costs fall towards zero, all increasing returns activities tend to concentrate in the 
larger country measured in terms of demand size. Therefore, demand differences amplify differences 
in production structures. This basic analysis can be extended by including in the model a third country 
with the purpose of examining the consequences of a regional integration process, like in Torstensson 
(1995) and Brülhart and Torstensson (1996). Specifically, they assume two asymmetric countries with 
respect to size forming a customs union and a remaining one as the Rest of the World. They show that 
there is a U-shaped relationship between the share of increasing returns industrial production located 
in the large country of the customs union and the deepness of the integration. 
However, when factor market considerations are conveniently introduced, as in Krugman and 
Venables (1990), there exists an inverted U-shaped relationship between the degree of relative and 
absolute spatial concentration of industry in the central country and trade costs. Thus, at intermediate 
levels of trade costs the number of manufacturing firms located in the large country due to its better 
market access is disproportionately large with respect to its share in world endowments (Amiti, 1998). 
The reason is that when trade costs are sufficiently high, location is mainly determined by product 
market competition, while when trade costs are sufficiently low the spatial result is fundamentally 
dictated by factor market competition (Ottaviano and Puga, 1997).  
The new trade theory cannot be seen as a complete theory of economic geography. Indeed, it 
assumes rather than explains international differences in manufacturing shares (Neary, 2001). 
Concretely, one main question is left unanswered by this theory: Why a priori similar countries can 
develop very different production structures? The new economic geography helps understanding such 
real world developments.   
                                                 
4 The following numerical example illuminates this point. Let us consider three countries, (A), (B), and (U) and two 
industries (1) and (2). First, let us assume that industry (1) has significant scale economies and is consequently 
highly absolutely concentrated, so that the shares of each country are: 0.15; 0.80; and 0.05, respectively. Second, 
suppose that industry (2) has low increasing returns and thus is absolutely dispersed with country shares equal to 
0.45; 0.30; 0.25, respectively. Finally, assume that the overall geographical distribution of manufacturing activity is 
as follows: 0.70; 0.20; 0.10, respectively. It appears that the industry with weak increasing returns exhibits a more 
relatively concentrated pattern, because it shows the biggest share differences with respect to the whole industry. 
Thus, in this case, scale economies would be negatively correlated with relative concentration. Nevertheless,  one 
could also construct a hypothetical example showing a positive correlation.   
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2.3 The New Economic Geography 
The new economic geography extends the line of research initiated by the new trade theory showing 
that interregional demand differences are themselves endogenous (Amiti, 1998). Thus, even the 
market size is explained within the model by starting from a featureless locus (Brülhart, 2001).   
In the presence of increasing returns and trade costs, firms and workers tend to locate close to large 
markets. Large markets are in turn those where more firms and workers locate (Baldwin, 1994; 
Ottaviano and Puga, 1997). Thus, there exists a sort of cumulative causation mechanism, which can 
lead to an endogenous differentiation process of initially similar regions. Therefore, in this case, 
second nature factors determine the locational pattern of economic activities (Brülhart, 1998; 
Venables, 1998). In particular, the new economic geography focuses on two main agglomeration 
mechanisms for modelling the cumulative causation process: interregional labour mobility (Krugman, 
1991) and mobility of firms demanding intermediate inputs (Venables, 1996).    
The basic idea postulated by Krugman (1991) is that if industrial workers are mobile across regions, 
the countervailing pressure against agglomeration exercised by the behaviour of factor markets would 
be eased,  firms could exploit the demand linkages to each other’s workers, and a persistent 
concentration would take place.
5  
Venables (1996) shows that agglomeration could be induced by input-output linkages among firms. 
When imperfectly competitive industries are linked through an input-output structure and trade costs 
are positive, the downstream industry forms the market for upstream firms and the latter are drawn to 
locations where there are relatively many firms of the former industry (demand linkage). Moreover, 
having a larger number of upstream firms in a location benefits downstream firms, which obtain their 
intermediate goods at lower costs by saving transport costs (cost linkages). The interaction of such 
linkages might result in an agglomeration of vertically linked industries (Amiti, 1998).  
The above result implies that the degree of absolute concentration is positively related to the intensity 
of own production used as intermediate inputs.
6 However, the new economic geography does not 
allow us to predict unambiguously the impact of intra-industry linkages on relative concentration.
7   
                                                 
5 The crucial point is that for industry agglomeration to occur firms must be able to draw resources from 
elsewhere, so that the factors’ supply becomes sufficiently elastic and thus large increases in factor prices are 
avoided (Puga, 1998). 
6 We should remark that the effect of intra-industry linkages on concentration is stronger the higher the degree of 
scale economies characterising the production in an industry (Krugman and Venables, 1996). Under similarity of   
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New economic geography models show that industry may agglomerate in one region when trade costs 
are reduced. However, this might be only the beginning of the process. When the induced dynamics in 
factor markets are considered, an inverted U-shaped pattern emerges (Venables, 1996; Ludema and 
Wooton, 1997; Puga 1998). Thus, at early stages of integration, concentration forces dominate and 
industry tends to cluster, but further integration promotes a re-dispersion of industries towards the 
periphery, which offers lower factor costs. 
 
2.4 Summary of Testable Hypotheses  
In the case of Mercosur, given the large size of Brazil, the analysis of absolute concentration patterns 
is of little interest. We therefore focus on relative concentration patterns. Previous sub-sections can be 
summarized in terms of the following testable hypotheses with respect to relative concentration: 
Hypothesis 1: Relative concentration is an increasing function of relative technology differences across 
countries.  
Hypothesis 2: Under lumpy distribution of factor endowments, relative concentration is an increasing 
function of relative factor use intensities.  
Hypothesis 3: Relative concentration is an increasing function of relative expenditure concentration. 
Hypothesis 4: Relative concentration is a decreasing function of trade costs according to the traditional 
trade theory (when demand is less concentrated than endowments) and the restricted version of the 
new trade theory (i.e., excluding factor market considerations) and maintains an inverted-U shaped 
relationship with respect to them according to the extended new trade theory (i.e., taking into account 
factor market considerations). Further, in the case of a regional trade agreement, relative 
concentration is positively related to external trade costs.    
                                                                                                                                                         
intra-industry linkage intensities, the industry with higher increasing returns will be the most absolutely 
concentrated.   
7 An argument similar to that for scale economies applies. The following hypothetical situation described by 
Haaland, Kind, Midelfart-Knarvik, and Torstensson (1999) can be useful for illustrating this indeterminacy. 
Assume that there are two asymmetric countries and consider two industries with different factor intensities. 
Under these conditions, the industry in which the small country has a comparative advantage will be relatively 
more concentrated. If this industry has the weaker input-output linkages, the pattern prevailing in the absence of 
such linkages does not significantly change and thus the industry exhibits the higher relative concentration level. 
However, if firms in such an industry use intensively their own goods as intermediates and sell a considerable 
proportion of their products to firms belonging to the same industry, agglomeration forces related to these linkages 
tend to bias the location of the industry towards the larger economy. Depending on the relative strength of the 
interactions between comparative advantage and factor intensities and size and input-output linkages the industry 
may end up with a still higher or a lower degree of relative concentration than the other one. Amiti (2001) presents 
a model combining relative factor endowment considerations and input-output linkages.    
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Hypothesis 5: The impact of increasing returns and intra-industry linkages on relative concentration is 
ambiguous. 
 
3. DATA, MEASUREMENT, AND DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE  
 
3.1 The Data  
In this paper, we investigate patterns and determinants of manufacturing concentration in Argentina, 
Brazil and Uruguay using a data set covering the period 1985-1998. Table 1 describes this data set. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
We identify manufacturing concentration patterns in the aforementioned countries using production 
data for 28 manufacturing branches (ISIC Rev. 2 Classification at 3 digits) over the period 1985-1998. 
These data are part of the PADI database produced by the Economic Commission for Latin America 
and Caribbean. It contains homogeneous statistical information for these variables.
8  
Determinants of manufacturing concentration are analysed using the following variables: imports and 
exports, value added, employment, number of establishments, qualification of workers, intermediate 
intensity, and tariffs. Import and export data, employment, and value added data for each country and 
for each manufacturing industry at the ISIC Rev.2 at 3 digit-level are taken from the PADI database. 
Information on the number of establishments and thus on average establishment size as well as data 
on the qualification level of workers in each sector for the period 1985-1998 come from the RAIS 
database (Annual Social Information Report) and were kindly provided by the Brazilian Ministry of 
Works. Data on intermediate consumption intensity, from one’s own sector and from the whole 
manufacturing sector, are derived from the Brazilian input-output tables published by IBGE (Brazilian 
Statistics Bureau). Finally, tariffs for each manufacturing sector in the period 1987-1998 are taken from 
Kume, Piani, and Braz de Sousa (2000). 
The data for the last four variables (the number of establishments, qualifications of workers, intensity 
of use of intermediate inputs, and tariffs) were available only for Brazil. Similar statistical information 
                                                 
8 In the case of Uruguay, available data correspond to the period 1971-1996. Data for 1997 and 1998 were 
obtained by applying sectoral variation rates calculated from a production database for Uruguay kindly provided 
by Marcel Vaillant.    
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for Argentina and Uruguay was not found. In the case of Argentina, data were available only for a few 
years.
9 A simple inspection of these data suggests that using the Brazilian data should not be, 
however, significantly misleading. For example, by comparing the establishment size between 
Argentina and Brazil, it turns out that the Spearman-rank correlation coefficient was 0.57 in 1985 and 
0.66 in 1994, in both cases significant at the 1% level. On the other hand, the simple correlation 
between Argentinean and Brazilian external tariffs for the ISIC Classification at 4 digits was 0.68 in 
1992 and 0.77 in 1994 (Sanguinetti and Sallustro, 2000).    
The data on establishments, qualification levels, intermediate intensity, and tariffs are reported 
according to the IBGE sub-sector classification. In order to get comparable figures, we have mapped 
them into the ISIC Rev. 2 Classification using a concordance table supplied by IBGE. Finally, our tariff 
data are available beginning with 1987. We assume that sectoral tariffs rates in 1985 and 1986 did not 
significantly differ from those in 1987.
10  
 
3.2 Measuring Relative Geographic Concentration of Manufacturing  
Geographic concentration can be defined as the narrowness of the range of geographical units in 
which a certain activity is carried out. As already mentioned, it is possible to distinguish between 
absolute and relative concentration. In absolute terms, an activity is geographically concentrated if a 
few countries account for a large share of that activity. Absolute measures of geographic concentration 
are influenced by large units. In order to account for the different sizes, relative measures of 
geographic concentration are used. In this case, the spatial distribution of a particular activity is 
compared to the spatial distribution of the whole manufacturing sector.  
Geographic concentration of manufacturing has been analysed using a variety of production data such 
as value added (WIFO, 1999), gross production values (Midelfart-Knarvik, Overman, Redding, and 
Venables, 2000), or manufacturing employment (Brülhart and Torstensson, 1996; Brülhart, 2001). In 
this paper, we use gross production values. The reference geographic unit is the country level.   
Formally, the production value of industry k in country i at time t is denoted by xik(t). This value may be 
expressed as a share of the total production value in the industry k as follows: 
                                                 
9 Information on the number of establishments is only available for the years 1985 and 1993 from the National 
Economic Census. Data on intermediate intensity exist only for 1985, 1993, and 1997.   
10 Kume, Piani, and Souza (2000) indicate that the Brazilian import policy at the starting year of their study, 1987, 




































Geographic concentration measures relate to the distribution of the ratio given by (1) (absolute or 
normalized, for instance, by (2)) across countries for a given industry. In this paper, we use a relative 
concentration measure derived from those proposed by Amiti (1996) and Haaland, Kind, Midelfart-
Knarvik, and Torstensson (1999). This index was firstly introduced by Florence (1948) and later used 
by Ellison and Glaeser (1997). Such an index is constructed on the basis of differences of shares ((1)-
(2)).
11 Formally,  
() N s s RC
2 N
1 i
i ik k ∑ − ≡
=
(3)
This index is equal to 0 when the spatial distribution of the industry under consideration coincides with 
that of the whole manufacturing industry, indicating maximum dispersion.  The upper bound is one, 
indicating maximum concentration of the respective industry. 
 
3.3  Descriptive Evidence 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of relative concentration of manufacturing in Mercosur over  the period 
1985-1998 measured with the RC Index calculated following (3) on the basis of two year moving 
averages. One can notice that relative concentration displays an upward trend.   
                                                 
11 This formula avoids some of the drawbacks of the Gini Coefficient. This index places implicit relative value on 
changes occurring in the middle part of the distribution. For a more detailed discussion of the statistical properties 
of the Gini Coefficient see Volpe Martincus (2002).   
  13
Insert Figure 1 about here 
At a sectoral level, we find that beverages, tobacco, pottery, and leather are highly concentrated in 
relative terms, while industries such as glass, textiles, food products, and fabricated metal products 
are dispersed (Table 2).  
Insert Table 2 about here 
As shown in Table 3, overall, there are changes in the rankings of industries over time, as suggested 
by declining correlations between periods.  
Insert Table 3 about here 
In order to check the significance of variations in the concentration index for each industry we have 
regressed the natural logarithm of the index on a time trend. Table 4 presents these estimation results.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
A number of industries, such as leather, pottery, printing and publishing, transport equipment, non-
electrical machinery, electrical machinery, and professional and scientific instruments show significant 
increases in the degree of concentration. A few industries, such as, food products, furniture, glass 
products, and fabricated metal products display decreases.    
 
 
4. DETERMINANTS OF MANUFACTURING CONCENTRATION PATTERNS 
In this section, we present the results of our econometric analysis testing the hypotheses identified in 
Section 2 about the driving forces of manufacturing concentration patterns. We discuss first our model 
specification, second estimation issues, and third our main findings.  
 
4.1 Model Specification 
Our econometric analysis aims at uncovering the determinants of relative concentration patterns in 
Mercosur. The dependent variable in our estimations is the relative concentration measure, the RC 
Index. The explanatory variables are discussed in details next.    
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Factor intensities  
The  Heckscher-Ohlin theory points out that, given a lumpy distribution of factor endowments, one 
should expect a positive relationship between the relative factor intensity of industries and their 
corresponding degree of relative concentration. This hypothesis can be tested using indices 
measuring the deviation of factor intensities from the mean (Amiti, 1997; Haaland, Kind, Midelfart-






























































where  L  represents employment, VA stands for value added, and H for workers with at least 
secondary school; i=1,…,N indicates countries, while k=1,…,M indicates industries.  
In the above definitions, labour intensity is measured as the number of employees relative to value 
added, whereas human capital intensity is measured as the number of skilled workers relative to the 
total number of workers. The intensity measures take high values for industries differing substantially 
in their use of the factor in question from the average (i.e., they employ a factor either much more or 




The  Ricardian theory highlights the role of technology differences across countries in explaining 
specialization and concentration of industries. Such differences in technology are captured by 
differences in labour productivity, defined as value added per employee (Torstensson, 1996; Haaland, 
























































technology   (6)
where VA and L have already been explained.    
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The first term within the brackets measures labour productivity in industry k in country i relative to 
average labour productivity in this industry across countries, whereas the second term measures 
average labour productivity in country i relative to the other countries. This index increases in cross-
country disparities in relative productivity. In particular, this measure displays large values for those 
industries for which there are large differences among countries in productivity relative to the whole 
manufacturing sector. According to the Ricardian  theory, significant relative productivity differences 
foster a high degree of cross-country specialization and relative spatial concentration. 
 
Market size  
According to the traditional trade theory, the spatial distribution of demand has an impact on the 
spatial configuration of the manufacturing sector if trade costs are positive. In particular, if demand is 
more evenly spread over space than endowments, industry concentration correlates negatively with 
trade costs (Brülhart, 2001). Further, under the presence of prohibitive trade costs, the degree of 
industrial geographical concentration coincides with the geographical concentration of expenditure. 
Moreover, the new trade theory predicts that firms tend to concentrate in the country that has a 
demand bias for the good they produce. This implies that demand concentration induces production 
concentration. In other words, the higher the relative spatial concentration of the demand for a 
particular good, the higher the relative spatial concentration of the respective manufacturing activity.
12 
Formally, relative expenditure concentration is measured as follows (Haaland, Kind, Midelfart-Knarvik, 
and Torstensson, 1999): 
















































where E denotes expenditure, defined as production plus imports minus exports (thus, including both 
final and intermediate consumption). The former expression indicates that the degree of relative 
                                                 
12 The new economic geography demonstrates that the expenditure concentration pattern may be endogenous, 
i.e., it may depend on the industrial concentration pattern. Our econometric strategy accounts therefore for this 
endogeneity as will be shown later in the paper.    
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expenditure concentration is higher the larger the deviation of the expenditure share of each country 
on a given industry’s goods with respect to their respective total expenditure shares. 
 
Economies of scale 
New trade theories do not provide any clear-cut guidance regarding the association between the 
intensity of increasing returns to scale and the level of concentration relative to other industries.  
Even though the variable has a priori no defined impact in terms of the expected sign, the variable 
might have an influence on locational patterns. Scale economies are an important component of the 
effect of other variables like market size. Therefore, in order to investigate whether and to what extent 
economies of scale affect the relative concentration of industries and to account for the role they play 
in shaping the incidence of other relevant variables, we include this variable in the regression 
equation. 
Economies of scale have been measured in different ways in the empirical literature. Brülhart and 
Torstensson (1996) use engineering estimates of minimum efficient scale. Haaland, Kind, Midelfart-
Knarvik, and Torstensson (1999) employ the percentage reduction in average cost for each percent 
increase in output. Here, we follow Kim (1995) and Amiti (1997), and use the average establishment 






scale =   (8)
where L corresponds to employment and EST symbolizes the number of establishments.  
 
Input-output linkages 
The new economic geography points out that, under increasing returns to scale and trade costs, input-
output linkages tend to foster industrial agglomeration. In particular, the intensity of an industry’s use 
of its own intermediate goods is positively correlated to its degree of absolute concentration. The new 
economic geography does not allow us, however, to draw clear conclusions with respect to the 
influence of intra-industry linkages on relative concentration. As already pointed out, the fact that the   
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direction of the impact is not theoretically a priori  determined does not necessarily imply that the 
variable has no impact on relative locational patterns. We therefore include in our regression analysis 
intermediate consumption from one’s own sector and test its influence on relative concentration. 
Formally, 





osint =   (9)
where INT stands for intermediate consumption from one’s own sector and PV for production value.
13 
An alternative specification will be based on an intermediate intensity variable for the whole 
manufacturing sector. The main idea is to test the significance of linkages among industries given the 
high concentration displayed by aggregate manufacturing activity in our sample countries. Formally,  













where INT and PV have been already explained.  
 
Trade costs  
Our literature review emphasizes that trade costs are an important factor in shaping the economic 
landscape. As discussed above, in the traditional trade  framework, demand patterns affect locational 
patterns when trade costs are positive. In particular, the neoclassical theory predicts that, under a 
lumpy distribution of factor endowments, a reduction in trade costs will induce an increase in the 
degree of relative concentration. Furthermore, in the case of a regional trade agreement, industrial 
location may be biased towards the country with the least comparative disadvantage vis à vis the Rest 
of the World. On the other hand, in the new trade theory the relationship between relative and absolute 
concentration and trade costs is monotonically decreasing when factor market considerations are not 
                                                 
13 One could argue that the information given by osint is already accounted for by the expenditure variable. In this 
respect, we should stress that, according to the new economic geography, input-output linkages not only have 
backward effectsi.e., they not only affect the market size for the industry), they also have forward effects in the 
sense that such linkages influence the production costs faced by firms. In short, the expenditure variable may 
capture in a gross way the spatial impact coming from demand linkages. However, this does not imply that one 
should disregard the variable osint, as it is needed to assess the incidence of cost linkages.    
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taken into account and non-monotonic when they are incorporated into the analysis. Similarly, in the 
new economic geography setting, market size and input-output linkages foster agglomeration due to 
the interaction between increasing returns and trade costs. More precisely, this latter theory suggests 
the existence of an inverted U relationship between trade costs and absolute concentration. However, 
the  new economic geography does not provide any clear guidance regarding the sign of the 
correlation between trade costs and relative concentration. 
Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay implemented broad trade liberalization programs over the last fifteen 
years. In order to account for the effects associated with the developments in external trade policies, 
we proxy trade costs with tariff barriers with respect to the rest of the world for each manufacturing 
sector in the period 1985-1998. Formally,  
Trade costs:  k np   (11)
These countries also signed a regional trade agreement jointly with Paraguay, Mercosur. In order to 
capture the impact of regional trade liberalization we use time dummies and time dummies interacted 
with the variables of interest. 
 
4.2 Econometric Issues 
The dependent variable in our model is the relative concentration measure RC Index defined as in 
equation (3) and calculated with production value data. This index takes values within the interval 
[0,1], which implies that the variable to be explained is truncated. As a consequence, estimation with 
OLS will lead to biased results. We therefore redefine the dependent variable using a logistic 
transformation similar to Torstensson (1997). The dependent variable then becomes ln[rc/(1-rc)], 
ranging in the interval() +∞ −∞, . We should note that, in the present case, the transformation does not 
require dropping out observations, since none of them takes the value zero. 
The degree of relative concentration will be explained in terms of the variables previously described, 
namely, factor endowments, relative technology differences, relative market size, the significance of 
increasing returns, the intensity of input-output linkages, and the level of trade costs. Formally, the 
basic specification is the following :   
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where k=311,…,390 (28 sectors), t=1985,…,1998, and  t k ε µ , represent industry and time fixed effects. 
The basic equation and some variants are estimated in the first place by OLS pooling over years, 
which produces LSDV (Least Square Dummy Variables), i.e. fixed effects estimations (Greene, 1997). 
The sample includes 28 industries and 14 years, so the estimation is based on 392 observations. 
Further, we condition on the standard deviations of the underlying variables in order to make 
comparisons across variables more appropriate. Thus, we report standardized coefficients. Finally, 
according to White’s general test (Greene, 1997), there is evidence of heteroscedasticity in our 
sample. We estimate therefore White’s heterocedastic consistent standard errors and use these 
consistent standard errors for hypotheses testing.   
There are a priori reasons to presume that some of the core conditions required for the validity of OLS 
may not be met. In particular, the following concerns should be addressed: potential endogeneity 
problems and potential cross-section and auto-correlation. 
The new economic geography shows that an agglomeration process may be induced by a circular 
causation mechanism, so that industrial location may be driven by expenditure location while at the 
same time the spatial distribution of manufacturing activity may influence the geographical pattern of 
spending. Hence, potential endogeneity problems might be anticipated. More precisely, there could 
exist a contemporaneous correlation between the error term and the market size variable. From a 
statistical point of view, this means that the regression equation does not correspond to a conditional 
expectation, so that the usual assumptions on the error term cannot be imposed (Verbeek, 2000). As a 
consequence, OLS estimations might be biased and inconsistent. In order to account for this 
possibility, we carry out several exercises and tests. First, we re-run the original regressions using only 
the initial value for the expenditure variable. Second, we estimate 2SLS regressions by instrumenting 
the variable in question by the respective one-period lag and then calculate the Hausman test 
statistics.  
In addition, the first estimation assumes a relatively simple error term. In more concrete terms, the 
standard error component model assumes that the regression disturbances are homoscedastic with   
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the same variance across time and across individuals, are not correlated across individuals, and that 
the only correlation over time is due to the presence of the same individual across the panel (i.e., the 
equicorrelation coefficient is the same no matter how far periods are in time). Undoubtedly, these are 
very restrictive assumptions. First, given the panel nature of the data, one can presume that there may 
be a specific pattern of disturbances associated with the presence of groups of observations. 
Specifically, cross-sectional units may be size-asymmetric and as a result may have different 
variations (Baltagi, 1995). Second, industries are not only tied to specific factors, they are also tied to 
common macroeconomic factors affecting the economy as a whole (Greene, 1997) and likely to 
differential repercussions across groups of sectors. Thus, it seems likely that disturbances could be 
correlated across industries. Third, an unobserved shock in the current period might affect the 
concentration patterns for at least some coming periods (Baltagi, 1995). Ignoring group-wise 
heteroscedasticity, cross sectional correlation and/or serial correlation when they are present results in 
consistent but inefficient estimates of the regression coefficients and biased standard errors (Baltagi, 
1995; Greene, 1997). Therefore, we carry out relevant test statistics for identifying such data features 
and implement an appropriate econometric strategy.  
 
4.3 Main Results 
Table 5 shows estimation results from the LSDV regression including sequentially increasing subsets 
of explanatory variables with and without time dummies.  
Insert Table 5 about here 
The first column corresponds to a pure traditional trade model, since only relative factor intensities 
(Heckscher-Ohlin theory) and relative technology differences (Ricardian theory) are considered. Notice 
that all estimated coefficients have the expected sign and are significant at conventional levels. Thus, 
relative concentration increases with relative factor intensities and relative technological differences. In 
particular, as expected under a lumpy distribution of factor endowments, the higher the absolute 
discrepancy between the individual labour and human capital intensities and the respective averages, 
the higher the level of relative concentration. Analogously, larger differences across countries between 
the individual relative labour productivity and the aggregate one are associated with higher relative   
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concentration. The incorporation of the trade costs variable (column 2) does not substantially alter the 
results: the estimated coefficient on this variable is not significant. 
In the next columns, 3 - 4 and 7 – 8, we included variables highlighted by the new trade theory, 
namely, scale economies and relative expenditure concentration. The estimated coefficient for scale 
economies is negative and significant in 3 out of 4 specifications, indicating that high increasing 
returns were associated with low relative concentration levels. Such a result can be explained in terms 
of the arguments previously raised when discussing the expected influence of scale economies. More 
precisely, from a theoretical point of view, the intensity of increasing returns may be linked a priori 
either to higher or lower relative concentration. Further, as we demonstrated in the numerical example, 
the link may be negative under certain specific locational patterns. On the other hand, one could argue 
that the proxy for economies of scale, the average establishment size, is not appropriate
14. In order to 
assess this possibility, we used an alternative definition for this variable, namely, the position of each 
industry in the ranking of activities according to their degree of increasing returns presented by Pratten 
(1988).
15 Estimation results are qualitatively the same
16.  
The estimated coefficient on relative expenditure concentration is positive and significant, suggesting 
that  relative concentration of spending tends to favour relative concentration of manufacturing activity. 
This finding is consistent with both the new trade theory and the Heckscher-Ohlin theory in the 
presence of positive trade costs. We should stress that this turns out to be the most important 
determinant of industrial location.  
Note that, compared with the estimation results from the pure traditional trade  model, the coefficient 
on trade costs becomes significantly positive. Hence, higher external tariff barriers with respect to the 
Rest of the World tend to foster increased relative concentration of industries within the trade bloc. 
This result coincides with the theoretical conclusion derived by Venables (2000) regarding the 
locational impact of customs unions. The combination of relatively high external barriers and internal 
trade liberalization may induce the spatial concentration of economic activity within the bloc.  
                                                 
14 Establishment size is a good proxy for economies of scale only under particular conditions. Further, using 
average size may hide significant intra-industry variations, i.e., an industry with a few large firms and many small 
firms and an industry with all mid-size firms may have the same average size.   
15 Brülhart and Torstensson (1996) uses this variant in different correlation analyses of concentration patterns for 
the European Union. In the present context, its use might be criticized on the ground that it is based on 
estimations from information coming exclusively from developed countries. Further, those estimates were carried 
out in the 1980s and thereafter significant changes in technology and production techniques have taken place 
(Haaland, Kind, Midelfart-Knarvik, and Torstensson, 1999).  
16 The results are available from the authors upon request.   
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Columns 9 - 16 report estimation results when input-output linkages are taken into account. High 
intermediate consumption intensity, from one’s own sector as well as from the whole manufacturing 
sector, is positively correlated with relative concentration, but in a non-significant way in most 
specifications. 
Tables 6 and 7 report estimations from alternative econometric strategies dealing with potential 
endogeneity. Note that the resulting patterns remain essentially the same. According to the Hausman 
statistic the null hypothesis of no contemporaneous correlation between the expenditure variable and 
the error term cannot be rejected. Therefore, endogeneity does not seem to be a severe problem. 
Insert Tables 6 and 7 about here 
Further, we calculated relevant test statistics for detecting non-spherical disturbances. The modified 
Wald statistic for groupwise heteroscedasticity in residuals (Greene, 1997) suggests that the null 
hypothesis of homoscedasticity across panels should be rejected. In addition, the Breusch-Pagan LM 
test (Greene, 1997) indicates that the null hypothesis of independence of errors across panels should 
also be rejected. Finally, the Baltagi-Li LM test (Baltagi, 1995) for first order serial correlation in a fixed 
effects model points out that the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation should be rejected, too. 
Henceforth, an alternative estimation method is needed. In particular, one can remove the 
autocorrelation from the data by means of the Prais-Winsten transformation (Greene, 1997) and, since 
the number of cross sectional units is substantially larger that the number of time periods (28 vs. 14), 
one can then use OLS but replacing OLS standard errors with panel-corrected standard errors 
accounting for heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlation across panels (Beck and Katz, 
1996). Results obtained by using such a procedure are reported in Table 8. They basically confirm the 
previous findings. 
Insert Table 8 about here 
Given the endogeneity and autocorrelation issues, we have also explored the robustness of our results 
in a dynamic panel setting. Thus, we performed GMM estimations using the procedure developed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991). Again estimation results are essentially in line with those above.    
Insert Table 9 about here   
  23
4.4 Does Mercosur Make a Difference? 
The previous estimations pooled across the 14 sample years, which implies the assumption that the 
parameters in the regression equation are stable over time. One interesting question in this respect is 
whether the underlying system has a different behavioural pattern after the creation of Mercosur. In 
order to provide a first answer to this question, we include a dummy variable for the Mercosur period. 
It takes a value of 1 for the years over the period 1991-1998 and 0 otherwise. This dummy variable is 
then interacted with the explanatory variables used before. The joint significance of such interactions 
is assessed through the Wald test. The test statistic leads to the rejection of the null hypothesis that 
parameters are stable over the whole sample period for almost all specifications.
17 Therefore, the 
relative importance of relative concentration determinants seems to have changed after the 
establishment of Mercosur.  
One natural additional question that arises is what those changes look like. The answer can be found 
in Table 10, which presents estimation results for the periods 1985-1990 and 1991-1998 with and 
without fixed time effects. Several remarks are in order. 
Insert Table 10 about here  
The estimated coefficients on labour intensity and on relative skill intensity evolve from being not 
significantly different from zero in the first sub-period to being significantly positive in the second sub-
period. Relative factor intensities and hence relative factor endowments seem to play a more 
important role in relative concentration patterns within the trade bloc. This is precisely what one would 
expect according to the Heckscher-Ohlin theory. 
The estimated coefficient on relative technology differences decreases from the first to the second 
sub-period. Further, in the specification including time dummies, this coefficient turns to be not-
significantly different from zero. This result could be explained in terms of a technological convergence 
across countries as a consequence of the opening of the economies.
18 
The coefficient on scale economies is positive and significant in the first sub-period and negative and 
insignificant in the second one. Thus, high increasing returns favoured high relative geographical 
                                                 
17 Detailed results can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
18 The variable capturing technology differences across countries can be considered a valid proxy for the relevant 
theoretical concept if wages do not significantly differ across countries (Torstensson, 1996). Thus, it might 
alternatively be argued that the variable loses its significance due to an increased divergence in this respect. By 
looking at the evolution of wages in dollars in Argentina after the implementation of the Convertibility Plan in 1991, 
this possibility should not be disregarded.    
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concentration of manufacturing activity before the constitution of Mercosur, when relatively high 
internal trade barriers segmented the market, but they lost explanatory power after the start of the 
unilateral and regional trade liberalization programs between considered countries. In order to 
understand this result, we should remember that during the 1970s and 1980s, Argentina, Brazil, and 
Uruguay signed bilateral agreements aimed at removing several trade barriers.
19 Hence, even though 
high, intra-regional barriers were to some extent already lower than extra-regional ones. In such a 
case, Brülhart and Torstensson (1996) show that, if the rest of the world is large, smaller countries 
within the region experience a competitiveness gain in increasing returns activities due to the 
improved access to a larger market that exceeds the competitiveness loss with respect to the country 
with the larger home market. Therefore, we should expect increased relative concentration for those 
activities in this first phase of trade liberalization. Now, as regional integration deepens as in the 
Southern Cone during the 1990s, the competitive advantages of larger countries within the bloc in 
sectors with economies of scale increase and become dominant. As a consequence, dispersion of 
production in these sectors is reversed. Such activities again tend to be concentrated. Precisely, this 
reversion amounts to a decreased significance in the association between increasing returns and 
relative concentration, which is what we observe in the second period.     
The estimated coefficient on relative expenditure is positive and significant at the 1% level across sub-
periods, but it decreases in size in the second period. In fact, relative labour intensity seems to be 
taking over the position as the most influential determinant of locational patterns.  
The remaining variables are, in general, not significantly different from zero. However, we should 
mention that the estimated coefficient on intensity in intermediate inputs (from one’s own sector as 
well as from the whole manufacturing sector) increases. In other words, after regional trade 
liberalization, relative concentration levels seem to be more sensitive to the degree of intensity in the 
use of manufactured inputs. In particular, a positive relationship seems to be arising. One possible 
explanation is that, as expected from the new economic geography, industries that intensively use 
intermediate goods are becoming markedly more absolutely concentrated in the larger countries and, 
in particular, significantly, more than the manufacturing sector as a whole. 
                                                 
19 These agreements include, among others, CAUCE (1974) between Argentina and Uruguay; PEC (1975) 
between Brazil and Uruguay; and PICE (1986), the “Treaty for Integration, Cooperation, and Development” 
(1988), and the Buenos Aires Act (1990) between Argentina and Brazil.    
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In summary, with the establishment of Mercosur, relative factor intensities become more relevant in 
the explanation of relative concentration levels, while other variables like technology, economies of 
scale, and relative expenditure lost relative importance. Overall, these results seem to confirm the 
main insights from the Heckscher-Ohlin theory: trade liberalization increases the locational influence of 
factor endowments, since it induces industries to settle in countries with matching comparative 
advantages. 
The previous analysis has shown that there are significant differences in the role played by the 
alternative determinants of relative manufacturing concentration patterns across periods with different 
average levels of openness. In this sense, we know from the trade liberalization program established 
in the Asunción Treaty that the degree of trade openness within the bloc has increased progressively 
during the 1990s. One interesting question then is whether the behavioural relationship between 
relative concentration and the explanatory variables remains the same over the second period, 1991-
1998. In particular, do estimated coefficients remain stable from 1991 to 1998? One natural way to 
address this issue is to split this period into two time intervals according to the evolution of Mercosur 
can be divided: the transition period (1991-1994) and the customs union period (1995-1998). We 
create a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for the second sub-period and proceed as before. The 
test statistics indicate that the interactions between the dummy variable and the explanatory variables 
are jointly significant and henceforth that the null hypothesis of constant parameters should be 
rejected.
20 Thus, the relative importance of the determinants of relative concentration seems to have 
varied as trade integration deepened in the region.  
We, therefore, ran separate regressions for each sub-period. Estimates are presented in Table 11. 
Again several points deserve being mentioned. 
Insert Table 11 about here  
We can observe that the coefficient on relative labour intensity increases over time. In the second sub-
period, it is positive and significant at the 1% level. Hence, as expected from the Heckscher-Ohlin 
theory, industries with labour intensities substantially different from the average are becoming more 
relatively concentrated as trade costs fall.  
                                                 
20  Detailed results can be obtained from the authors upon request.    
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In contrast to labour intensity, skill intensity seems to be losing explanatory power. More precisely, the 
estimated coefficient on this variable is positive and significant for period 1991-1998, but its effect is 
strongly present only from 1991-1994 (see Tables 10 and 11). By looking at the scores for individual 
industries, we can detect that the variability of relative skill intensity across sectors increases over the 
period 1991-1995 and decreases thereafter. Thus, activities have converged in terms of their human 
capital intensity towards the end of the period. Given the multivariate definition of economic 
geography, this fact may help us understand the decline in the coefficient on relative skill intensity.  
The estimated coefficient on technology shows a strong downward trend, while the coefficient on   
economies of scale remains not significantly different from zero over the analysed period. 
Further, the coefficient on relative expenditure is positive and significant and remains largely constant 
in size. 
Our results confirm the upward trend of the coefficient on intermediate consumption intensity. This 
coefficient becomes positive and significant in the second sub-period for the 4 specifications 
considering total manufactured inputs and for 2 out of 4 specifications taking into account only inputs 
from one’s own sector. Thus, input-output linkages gain relative influence in the determination of 
concentration patterns as trade becomes freer. As already noticed, this result is in line with theory’s 
predictions.  
In summary, we find that economic integration deepening within Mercosur seems to be associated 
with an increasing influence of one typical element stressed by the Heckscher-Ohlin theory, namely, 
relative labour intensity, and a rather stable relative importance of one central factor underlined by the 
new trade theory, namely, expenditure concentration. In addition, production linkages have become 
relatively more important in explaining observed locational patterns.    
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5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
South American countries increased substantially the trade ties among themselves and with the rest of 
the world thanks to both general unilateral and regional trade liberalization initiatives, such as 
Mercosur. According to international trade theory, one should expect such trade policy changes to be 
associated with important changes in the economic landscape of the integrating area. In addition, 
these locational shifts, due to their welfare, political economy, and macroeconomic implications, are 
highly relevant from an economic policy point of view. Yet, to date, there are only a few empirical 
studies investigating the spatial implications of trade liberalization in countries belonging to Mercosur. 
This paper aimed at filling this gap. On the basis of a descriptive analysis of relative concentration 
patterns and several econometric exercises focused on the period 1985-1998, we attempted to 
provide an answer to the following questions: How concentrated/dispersed are industries? Have 
concentration levels changed significantly over time? What are the factors driving the observed 
relative concentration patterns? Did the establishment of Mercosur have an impact on the relative 
importance of these explanatory factors? 
Our main findings indicate that certain industries, such as beverages, tobacco, pottery, and leather are 
highly concentrated in relative terms, while industries such as glass, textiles, food products, and 
fabricated metal products are dispersed. With respect to the dynamic story, we find that, on average, 
relative concentration increased over the sample period. In particular, leather, pottery, printing and 
publishing, transport equipment, non-electrical machinery, electrical machinery, and professional and 
scientific instruments show significant increases, while industries such as food products, furniture, 
glass products, and fabricated metal products display decreases.    
With the aim of uncovering determinants of relative concentration patterns, we reviewed relevant 
existing international trade theories and derived model specifications to be estimated. We thus 
regressed relative concentration measures on measures of technological and relative factor intensities 
(traditional trade theory), scale economies and exogenous market size (new trade theory), input-output 
linkages (new economic geography), and, to account for trade reforms, on external nominal tariffs and 
time dummies. Our results suggest that localization of demand and comparative advantages are the 
main driving forces behind the observed relative concentration patterns. In addition, we find that the 
establishment of Mercosur played a significant role in shaping the changing patterns of relative 
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Variable Aggregation Country coverage Period Source
Production value  ISIC. Rev. 2, 3digits Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay 1985-1998 PADI/ECLAC
Employment  ISIC. Rev. 2, 3digits Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay 1985-1998 PADI/ECLAC
Value added  ISIC. Rev. 2, 3digits Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay 1985-1998 PADI/ECLAC
Exports  ISIC. Rev. 2, 3digits Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay 1985-1998 PADI/ECLAC
Imports  ISIC. Rev. 2, 3digits Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay 1985-1998 PADI/ECLAC
Number of establishments IBGE Subsector Classification Brazil 1985-1998 RAIS/Ministry of Works
Workers qualification IBGE Subsector Classification Brazil 1985-1998 RAIS/Ministry of Works
Intermediate inputs IBGE Subsector Classification Brazil 1985, 1990-1998 IBGE
Tariffs   IBGE Subsector Classification Brazil 1987-1998 Kume, Piani, Souza (2000)
Data availability
RC Index (1985-1998) 








1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997





Sector/Year 1985-1990 1991-1994 1995-1998 III/I
Food products 0.05 0.02 0.02 -0.022
Beverages 0.20 0.21 0.19 -0.006
Tobacco 0.20 0.19 0.22 0.020
Textiles 0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.010
Wearing apparel, except footwear 0.08 0.08 0.07 -0.016
Manufacture of leather and leather products 0.13 0.16 0.26 0.131
Footwear 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.001
Wood products 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.008
Furniture 0.08 0.05 0.04 -0.041
Manufacture of paper and paper products 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.036
Printing and publishing 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.037
Industrial chemicals 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.007
Other chemicals products 0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.005
Petroleum refineries 0.19 0.18 0.17 -0.018
Miscellaneos products of petroleum and coal 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.000
Rubber products 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.031
Plastic products 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.014
Pottery, china, and earthenware 0.16 0.22 0.23 0.063
Manufacture of glass and glass products 0.02 0.04 0.00 -0.020
Other non-metallic minerals 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.012
Iron and steel 0.04 0.06 0.04 -0.004
Non-ferrous metals 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.036
Fabricated metal products 0.06 0.05 0.03 -0.024
Non-electrical machinery 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.030
Electrical machinery 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.032
Transport equipment 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.045
Professional and scientific instruments 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.042
Other manufacturing industries 0.16 0.19 0.20 0.034
Simple average 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.015
Weighted average 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.004
Standard Deviation 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.015
Skewness 0.54 0.53 0.60 0.054
Kurtosis -0.82 -1.04 -0.80 0.028
Relative concentration - RC Index (1985-1998)
1985-1990 1991-1994 1995-1998
1985-1990 1.000 0.923 0.887
1991-1994 1.000 0.950
1995-1998 1.000
Relative concentration - RC Index (1985-1998)
Spearman Correlations  
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Note: The firts row reports the estimated coefficient and the 
the second row indicates the standard error.





Wearing apparel, except footwear









Miscellaneos products of petroleum and coal
Rubber products
Plastic products
Pottery, china, and earthenware
Manufacture of glass and glass products
Other manufacturing industries















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc
labint 0.300 0.272 0.373 0.291 0.371 0.376 0.204 0.213 0.360 0.279 0.333 0.250 0.206 0.217 0.183 0.192
(0.130)** (0.142)* (0.118)*** (0.129)** (0.150)** (0.150)** (0.131) (0.132) (0.113)*** (0.125)** (0.117)*** (0.130)* (0.131) (0.132) (0.132) (0.133)
relskillint 0.283 0.317 0.166 0.247 0.258 0.251 0.327 0.316 0.161 0.241 0.146 0.227 0.314 0.299 0.297 0.285
(0.102)*** (0.115)*** (0.077)** (0.081)*** (0.112)** (0.111)** (0.091)*** (0.090)*** (0.076)** (0.079)*** (0.079)* (0.082)*** (0.088)*** (0.087)*** (0.093)*** (0.092)***
technology 0.123 0.134 0.100 0.136 0.280 0.293 0.096 0.113 0.102 0.138 0.101 0.137 0.099 0.119 0.118 0.138
(0.029)*** (0.033)*** (0.025)*** (0.030)*** (0.062)*** (0.066)*** (0.050)* (0.054)** (0.025)*** (0.030)*** (0.025)*** (0.030)*** (0.050)** (0.055)** (0.057)** (0.062)**
scale -0.079 -0.168 -0.242 -0.234 -0.072 -0.161 -0.081 -0.171 -0.228 -0.215 -0.232 -0.223
(0.052) (0.055)*** (0.064)*** (0.066)*** (0.052) (0.055)*** (0.053) (0.057)*** (0.067)*** (0.070)*** (0.064)*** (0.066)***
relexpconc 0.370 0.374 0.389 0.393 0.367 0.372 0.366 0.370 0.385 0.389 0.379 0.383
(0.061)*** (0.062)*** (0.069)*** (0.069)*** (0.060)*** (0.061)*** (0.061)*** (0.062)*** (0.069)*** (0.067)*** (0.070)*** (0.069)***
osint 0.308 0.291 0.210 0.258
(0.196) (0.191) (0.213) (0.219)
wmsint 0.151 0.153 0.136 0.144
(0.086)* (0.085)* (0.094) (0.095)
np 0.032 0.112 0.085 0.114 0.110 0.112 0.129 0.121
(0.038) (0.038)*** (0.072) (0.068)* (0.038)*** (0.038)*** (0.072)* (0.069)*
Obs. 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392
Adj. R2 0.78 0.78 0.82 0.82 0.78 0.78 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82
Ind. Effects Y e sY e sY e sY e sY e sY e sY e sY e sY e sY e sY e sY e sY e sY e sY e sY e s
Time Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Robust standard errors in parentheses.





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc
labint 0.206 0.217 0.183 0.192 0.280 0.288 0.237 0.243
(0.131) (0.132) (0.132) (0.133) (0.148)* (0.149)* (0.149) (0.150)
relskillint 0.314 0.299 0.297 0.285 0.276 0.266 0.243 0.235
(0.088)*** (0.087)*** (0.093)*** (0.092)*** (0.102)*** (0.101)*** (0.104)** (0.104)**
technology 0.099 0.119 0.118 0.138 0.249 0.264 0.281 0.295
(0.050)** (0.055)** (0.057)** (0.062)** (0.056)*** (0.062)*** (0.063)*** (0.069)***
scale -0.228 -0.215 -0.232 -0.223 -0.215 -0.206 -0.220 -0.214
(0.067)*** (0.070)*** (0.064)*** (0.066)*** (0.069)*** (0.072)*** (0.066)*** (0.069)***
relexpconc 0.385 0.389 0.379 0.383
(0.069)*** (0.067)*** (0.070)*** (0.069)***
relexpconciy 0.948 0.950 0.896 0.886
(0.135)*** (0.134)*** (0.125)*** (0.126)***
osint 0.210 0.258 0.353 0.387
(0.213) (0.219) (0.234) (0.241)
wmsint 0.136 0.144 0.255 0.261
(0.094) (0.095) (0.099)** (0.100)***
np 0.129 0.121 0.089 0.080
(0.072)* (0.069)* (0.077) (0.076)
Obs. 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392
Adj. R2 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78
Ind. Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
The industry dummy i2 was supressed from the regression with relexpconc in the initial year due to collinearity.






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc
labint 0.214 0.206 0.225 0.217 0.189 0.183 0.197 0.192
(0.101)** (0.101)** (0.101)** (0.101)** (0.102)* (0.102)* (0.102)* (0.102)*
relskillint 0.310 0.314 0.296 0.299 0.291 0.297 0.280 0.285
(0.097)*** (0.097)*** (0.097)*** (0.097)*** (0.098)*** (0.098)*** (0.099)*** (0.098)***
technology 0.116 0.099 0.135 0.119 0.136 0.118 0.154 0.138
(0.069)* (0.067) (0.070)* (0.068)* (0.071)* (0.069)* (0.072)** (0.070)**
scale -0.226 -0.228 -0.214 -0.215 -0.231 -0.232 -0.222 -0.223
(0.080)*** (0.080)*** (0.080)*** (0.080)*** (0.079)*** (0.079)*** (0.079)*** (0.079)***
relexpconc 0.341 0.385 0.347 0.389 0.338 0.379 0.344 0.383
(0.065)*** (0.046)*** (0.065)*** (0.046)*** (0.065)*** (0.046)*** (0.065)*** (0.046)***
osint 0.226 0.210 0.272 0.258
(0.209) (0.208) (0.211) (0.210)
wmsint 0.149 0.136 0.156 0.144
(0.099) (0.097) (0.099) (0.097)
np 0.124 0.129 0.117 0.121
(0.081) (0.081) (0.080) (0.080)
Obs. 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392
Adj. R2 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82
Hausman 0.94 0.85 0.81 0.72
Ind. Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Standard errors in parentheses.
Relexpconc was instrumented with ist own one lag value.
(1),(3),(5),(7): OLS; (2),(4),(6),(8): IV







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc
labint 0.229 0.232 0.219 0.222 0.298 0.298 0.287 0.291
(0.139)* (0.139)* (0.140) (0.141) (0.141)** (0.140)** (0.141)** (0.141)**
relskillint 0.244 0.238 0.235 0.229 0.228 0.227 0.203 0.207
(0.100)** (0.099)** (0.101)** (0.100)** (0.083)*** (0.083)*** (0.081)** (0.083)**
technology 0.074 0.082 0.086 0.093 0.125 0.131 0.140 0.146
(0.056) (0.057) (0.058) (0.059) (0.052)** (0.052)** (0.055)** (0.055)***
scale -0.114 -0.114 -0.122 -0.120 -0.157 -0.150 -0.155 -0.151
(0.058)** (0.058)* (0.060)** (0.060)** (0.063)** (0.063)** (0.065)** (0.066)**
relexpconc 0.457 0.460 0.452 0.455 0.542 0.547 0.538 0.544
(0.064)*** (0.064)*** (0.064)*** (0.064)*** (0.071)*** (0.071)*** (0.072)*** (0.072)***
osint 0.374 0.391 0.253 0.286
(0.252) (0.251) (0.241) (0.240)
wmsint 0.158 0.161 0.163 0.156
(0.089)* (0.089)* (0.068)** (0.068)**
np 0.098 0.091 0.112 0.093
(0.074) (0.074) (0.081) (0.078)
Obs. 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392
Ind. Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses (correction for cross sectional correlation and autocorrelation).
(1)-(4): Common autocorrelation coefficient; (5)-(8): Panel specific autcorrelation coefficient.
Addressing panel correlations (PW-regressions with panel corrected standard errors)  
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S  22.760 16.310
M2 -1.460 -1.330
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The table reports one-step estimations with robust standard errors
S is the Sargan test statistics of over-identifying restrictions (based on two-step estimations)
M2 is the Arellano-Bond test statistics for second order autocorrelation
Relexpconc is treated as endogenous







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc
labint -0.088 -0.094 -0.084 -0.090 0.051 0.070 0.052 0.072 0.477 0.480 0.447 0.452 0.420 0.422 0.423 0.426
(0.116) (0.123) (0.116) (0.120) (0.138) (0.140) (0.136) (0.138) (0.189)** (0.188)** (0.184)** (0.181)** (0.213)** (0.217)* (0.211)** (0.215)**
relskillint -0.241 -0.184 -0.231 -0.177 -0.331 -0.304 -0.328 -0.288 0.146 0.144 0.152 0.147 0.227 0.227 0.212 0.211
(0.309) (0.411) (0.330) (0.438) (0.427) (0.429) (0.469) (0.463) (0.087)* (0.090) (0.090)* (0.090) (0.102)** (0.101)** (0.101)** (0.100)**
technology 0.217 0.215 0.220 0.218 0.407 0.416 0.408 0.419 0.086 0.085 0.080 0.077 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.011
(0.044)*** (0.048)*** (0.038)*** (0.039)*** (0.067)*** (0.068)*** (0.073)*** (0.071)*** (0.027)*** (0.028)*** (0.024)*** (0.024)*** (0.073) (0.073) (0.072) (0.073)
scale 0.264 0.246 0.255 0.239 0.296 0.351 0.295 0.343 -0.065 -0.060 -0.093 -0.080 -0.118 -0.119 -0.126 -0.127
(0.127)** (0.143)* (0.129)** (0.148) (0.186) (0.190)* (0.197) (0.203)* (0.061) (0.066) (0.074) (0.075) (0.077) (0.079) (0.082) (0.084)
relexpconc 0.687 0.678 0.689 0.680 0.731 0.752 0.732 0.753 0.400 0.399 0.392 0.390 0.431 0.432 0.416 0.418
(0.098)*** (0.104)*** (0.095)*** (0.100)*** (0.110)*** (0.108)*** (0.108)*** (0.108)*** (0.071)*** (0.072)*** (0.070)*** (0.071)*** (0.078)*** (0.079)*** (0.075)*** (0.076)***
osint 0.016 0.030 0.017 0.102 0.298 0.303 0.276 0.271
(0.552) (0.570) (0.535) (0.492) (0.382) (0.379) (0.385) (0.378)
wmsint -0.032 -0.026 0.000 -0.000 0.519 0.537 0.461 0.463
(0.066) (0.073) (0.085) (0.086) (0.285)* (0.283)* (0.309) (0.313)
np 0.018 0.017 0.122 0.118 -0.026 -0.069 0.043 0.078
(0.044) (0.041) (0.086) (0.087) (0.099) (0.084) (0.222) (0.218)
Obs. 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224
Ind. Effects Y e sY e sY e sY e sY e sY e sY e sY e sY e sY e sY e sY e sY e sY e sY e sY e s
Time Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
(1)-(8): OLS regressions with panel corrected standard errors;(9)-(16): P-W regressions with panel corrected standard errors. 
1985-1990 1991-1998






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc lnrc
labint 0.189 0.170 0.169 0.154 0.154 0.128 0.144 0.119 0.854 0.891 0.865 0.948 0.998 1.000 1.033 1.020
(0.100)* (0.084)** (0.095)* (0.082)* (0.081)* (0.094) (0.081)* (0.093) (0.249)*** (0.287)*** (0.239)*** (0.293)*** (0.353)*** (0.351)*** (0.344)*** (0.339)***
relskillint 0.331 0.382 0.368 0.399 0.472 0.494 0.477 0.499 0.172 0.182 0.006 0.011 0.224 0.221 0.061 0.082
(0.139)** (0.158)** (0.152)** (0.168)** (0.161)*** (0.150)*** (0.171)*** (0.162)*** (0.082)** (0.086)** (0.105) (0.104) (0.088)** (0.087)** (0.113) (0.125)
technology 0.050 0.063 0.057 0.069 0.196 0.190 0.203 0.198 -0.100 -0.112 -0.073 -0.100 -0.200 -0.200 -0.208 -0.205
(0.030) (0.026)** (0.030)* (0.028)** (0.076)*** (0.075)** (0.075)*** (0.074)*** (0.065) (0.068) (0.070) (0.075) (0.079)** (0.079)** (0.087)** (0.081)**
scale -0.004 -0.058 -0.016 -0.062 -0.039 -0.029 -0.039 -0.029 -0.131 -0.010 -0.159 0.052 0.164 0.166 0.157 0.140
(0.086) (0.121) (0.095) (0.122) (0.121) (0.120) (0.122) (0.121) (0.151) (0.157) (0.172) (0.177) (0.242) (0.243) (0.238) (0.233)
relexpconc 0.672 0.684 0.647 0.667 0.675 0.676 0.667 0.668 0.679 0.670 0.657 0.645 0.692 0.691 0.670 0.674
(0.044)*** (0.046)*** (0.046)*** (0.045)*** (0.051)*** (0.050)*** (0.055)*** (0.055)*** (0.152)*** (0.142)*** (0.158)*** (0.138)*** (0.147)*** (0.147)*** (0.144)*** (0.141)***
osint -0.331 -0.346 -0.284 -0.291 2.023 2.089 1.545 1.541
(0.194)* (0.198)* (0.197) (0.192) (1.065)* (1.053)** (1.261) (1.272)
wmsint 0.120 0.037 -0.040 -0.032 2.166 2.422 2.297 2.388
(0.168) (0.166) (0.182) (0.190) (0.639)*** (0.765)*** (0.713)*** (0.771)***
np 0.063 0.061 -0.049 -0.046 0.093 0.172 -0.014 0.112
(0.034)* (0.039) (0.037) (0.039) (0.114) (0.134) (0.103) (0.088)
Obs. 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112
Ind. Effects Y e sY e sY e sY e sY e sY e sY e sY e sY e sY e sY e sY e sY e sY e sY e sY e s
Time Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
(1)-(8): OLS regressions with panel corrected standard errors;(9)-(16): P-W regressions with panel corrected standard errors. 
Subperiods regressions (1991-1994 and 1995-1998)
1991-1994 1995-19982008
B01-08 Euro-Diplomatie durch gemeinsame „Wirtschaftsregierung“ Martin Seidel
2007
B03-07 Löhne und Steuern im Systemwettbewerb der Mitgliedstaaten
der Europäischen Union
Martin Seidel
B02-07 Konsolidierung und Reform der Europäischen Union Martin Seidel
B01-07 The Ratiﬁcation of European Treaties - Legal and Constitutio-
nal Basis of a European Referendum.
Martin Seidel
2006
B03-06 Financial Frictions, Capital Reallocation, and Aggregate Fluc-
tuations
Jürgen von Hagen, Haiping Zhang
B02-06 Financial Openness and Macroeconomic Volatility Jürgen von Hagen, Haiping Zhang
B01-06 A Welfare Analysis of Capital Account Liberalization Jürgen von Hagen, Haiping Zhang
2005
B11-05 Das Kompetenz- und Entscheidungssystem des Vertrages von
Rom im Wandel seiner Funktion und Verfassung
Martin Seidel
B10-05 Die Schutzklauseln der Beitrittsverträge Martin Seidel
B09-05 Measuring Tax Burdens in Europe Guntram B. Wolﬀ
B08-05 Remittances as Investment in the Absence of Altruism Gabriel González-König
B07-05 Economic Integration in a Multicone World? Christian Volpe Martincus, Jenni-
fer Pédussel Wu
B06-05 Banking Sector (Under?)Development in Central and Eastern
Europe
Jürgen von Hagen, Valeriya Din-
ger
B05-05 Regulatory Standards Can Lead to Predation Stefan Lutz
B04-05 Währungspolitik als Sozialpolitik Martin Seidel
B03-05 Public Education in an Integrated Europe: Studying to Migrate
and Teaching to Stay?
Panu Poutvaara
B02-05 Voice of the Diaspora: An Analysis of Migrant Voting Behavior Jan Fidrmuc, Orla Doyle
B01-05 Macroeconomic Adjustment in the New EU Member States Jürgen von Hagen, Iulia Traistaru
2004
B33-04 The Eﬀects of Transition and Political Instability On Foreign
Direct Investment Inﬂows: Central Europe and the Balkans
Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan, Ta-
ner M. Yigit
B32-04 The Choice of Exchange Rate Regimes in Developing Coun-
tries: A Mulitnominal Panal Analysis
Jürgen von Hagen, Jizhong Zhou
B31-04 Fear of Floating and Fear of Pegging: An Empirical Anaysis of
De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes in Developing Countries
Jürgen von Hagen, Jizhong Zhou
B30-04 Der Vollzug von Gemeinschaftsrecht über die Mitgliedstaaten
und seine Rolle für die EU und den Beitrittsprozess
Martin Seidel
B29-04 Deutschlands Wirtschaft, seine Schulden und die Unzulänglich-
keiten der einheitlichen Geldpolitik im Eurosystem
Dieter Spethmann, Otto Steiger
B28-04 Fiscal Crises in U.S. Cities: Structural and Non-structural Cau-
ses
Guntram B. Wolﬀ
B27-04 Firm Performance and Privatization in Ukraine Galyna Grygorenko, Stefan Lutz
B26-04 Analyzing Trade Opening in Ukraine: Eﬀects of a Customs Uni-
on with the EU
Oksana Harbuzyuk, Stefan Lutz
B25-04 Exchange Rate Risk and Convergence to the Euro Lucjan T. Orlowski
B24-04 The Endogeneity of Money and the Eurosystem Otto Steiger
B23-04 Which Lender of Last Resort for the Eurosystem? Otto Steiger
B22-04 Non-Discretonary Monetary Policy: The Answer for Transition
Economies?
Elham-Maﬁ Kreft, Steven F. Kreft
B21-04 The Eﬀectiveness of Subsidies Revisited: Accounting for Wage
and Employment Eﬀects in Business R+D
Volker Reinthaler, Guntram B.
Wolﬀ
B20-04 Money Market Pressure and the Determinants of Banking Cri-
ses
Jürgen von Hagen, Tai-kuang Ho
B19-04 Die Stellung der Europäischen Zentralbank nach dem Verfas-
sungsvertrag
Martin SeidelB18-04 Transmission Channels of Business Cycles Synchronization in
an Enlarged EMU
Iulia Traistaru
B17-04 Foreign Exchange Regime, the Real Exchange Rate and Current
Account Sustainability: The Case of Turkey
Sübidey Togan, Hasan Ersel
B16-04 Does It Matter Where Immigrants Work? Traded Goods, Non-
traded Goods, and Sector Speciﬁc Employment
Harry P. Bowen, Jennifer Pédussel
Wu
B15-04 Do Economic Integration and Fiscal Competition Help to Ex-
plain Local Patterns?
Christian Volpe Martincus
B14-04 Euro Adoption and Maastricht Criteria: Rules or Discretion? Jiri Jonas
B13-04 The Role of Electoral and Party Systems in the Development of
Fiscal Institutions in the Central and Eastern European Coun-
tries
Sami Yläoutinen
B12-04 Measuring and Explaining Levels of Regional Economic Inte-
gration
Jennifer Pédussel Wu
B11-04 Economic Integration and Location of Manufacturing Activi-
ties: Evidence from MERCOSUR
Pablo Sanguinetti, Iulia Traistaru,
Christian Volpe Martincus
B10-04 Economic Integration and Industry Location in Transition
Countries
Laura Resmini
B09-04 Testing Creditor Moral Hazard in Souvereign Bond Markets: A
Uniﬁed Theoretical Approach and Empirical Evidence
Ayse Y. Evrensel, Ali M. Kutan
B08-04 European Integration, Productivity Growth and Real Conver-
gence
Taner M. Yigit, Ali M. Kutan
B07-04 The Contribution of Income, Social Capital, and Institutions to
Human Well-being in Africa
Mina Baliamoune-Lutz, Stefan H.
Lutz
B06-04 Rural Urban Inequality in Africa: A Panel Study of the Eﬀects
of Trade Liberalization and Financial Deepening
Mina Baliamoune-Lutz, Stefan H.
Lutz
B05-04 Money Rules for the Eurozone Candidate Countries Lucjan T. Orlowski
B04-04 Who is in Favor of Enlargement? Determinants of Support for
EU Membership in the Candidate Countries’ Referenda
Orla Doyle, Jan Fidrmuc
B03-04 Over- and Underbidding in Central Bank Open Market Opera-
tions Conducted as Fixed Rate Tender
Ulrich Bindseil
B02-04 Total Factor Productivity and Economic Freedom Implications
for EU Enlargement
Ronald L. Moomaw, Euy Seok
Yang
B01-04 Die neuen Schutzklauseln der Artikel 38 und 39 des Bei-
trittsvertrages: Schutz der alten Mitgliedstaaten vor Störungen
durch die neuen Mitgliedstaaten
Martin Seidel
2003
B29-03 Macroeconomic Implications of Low Inﬂation in the Euro Area Jürgen von Hagen, Boris Hofmann
B28-03 The Eﬀects of Transition and Political Instability on Foreign
Direct Investment: Central Europe and the Balkans
Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan, Ta-
ner M. Yigit
B27-03 The Performance of the Euribor Futures Market: Eﬃciency and
the Impact of ECB Policy Announcements (Electronic Version
of International Finance)
Kerstin Bernoth, Juergen von Ha-
gen
B26-03 Souvereign Risk Premia in the European Government Bond
Market (überarbeitete Version zum Herunterladen)
Kerstin Bernoth, Juergen von Ha-
gen, Ludger Schulknecht
B25-03 How Flexible are Wages in EU Accession Countries? Anna Iara, Iulia Traistaru
B24-03 Monetary Policy Reaction Functions: ECB versus Bundesbank Bernd Hayo, Boris Hofmann
B23-03 Economic Integration and Manufacturing Concentration Pat-
terns: Evidence from Mercosur
Iulia Traistaru, Christian Volpe
Martincus
B22-03 Reformzwänge innerhalb der EU angesichts der Osterweiterung Martin Seidel
B21-03 Reputation Flows: Contractual Disputes and the Channels for
Inter-Firm Communication
William Pyle
B20-03 Urban Primacy, Gigantism, and International Trade: Evidence
from Asia and the Americas
Ronald L. Moomaw, Mohammed
A. Alwosabi
B19-03 An Empirical Analysis of Competing Explanations of Urban Pri-
macy Evidence from Asia and the Americas
Ronald L. Moomaw, Mohammed
A. AlwosabiB18-03 The Eﬀects of Regional and Industry-Wide FDI Spillovers on
Export of Ukrainian Firms
Stefan H. Lutz, Oleksandr Talave-
ra, Sang-Min Park
B17-03 Determinants of Inter-Regional Migration in the Baltic States Mihails Hazans
B16-03 South-East Europe: Economic Performance, Perspectives, and
Policy Challenges
Iulia Traistaru, Jürgen von Hagen
B15-03 Employed and Unemployed Search: The Marginal Willingness
to Pay for Attributes in Lithuania, the US and the Netherlands
Jos van Ommeren, Mihails Hazans
B14-03 FCIs and Economic Activity: Some International Evidence Charles Goodhart, Boris Hofmann
B13-03 The IS Curve and the Transmission of Monetary Policy: Is there
a Puzzle?
Charles Goodhart, Boris Hofmann
B12-03 What Makes Regions in Eastern Europe Catching Up? The
Role of Foreign Investment, Human Resources, and Geography
Gabriele Tondl, Goran Vuksic
B11-03 Die Weisungs- und Herrschaftsmacht der Europäischen Zen-
tralbank im europäischen System der Zentralbanken - eine
rechtliche Analyse
Martin Seidel
B10-03 Foreign Direct Investment and Perceptions of Vulnerability to
Foreign Exchange Crises: Evidence from Transition Economies
Josef C. Brada, Vladimír Tomsík
B09-03 The European Central Bank and the Eurosystem: An Analy-
sis of the Missing Central Monetary Institution in European
Monetary Union
Gunnar Heinsohn, Otto Steiger
B08-03 The Determination of Capital Controls: Which Role Do Ex-
change Rate Regimes Play?
Jürgen von Hagen, Jizhong Zhou
B07-03 Nach Nizza und Stockholm: Stand des Binnenmarktes und
Prioritäten für die Zukunft
Martin Seidel
B06-03 Fiscal Discipline and Growth in Euroland. Experiences with the
Stability and Growth Pact
Jürgen von Hagen
B05-03 Reconsidering the Evidence: Are Eurozone Business Cycles
Converging?
Michael Massmann, James Mit-
chell
B04-03 Do Ukrainian Firms Beneﬁt from FDI? Stefan H. Lutz, Oleksandr Talave-
ra
B03-03 Europäische Steuerkoordination und die Schweiz Stefan H. Lutz
B02-03 Commuting in the Baltic States: Patterns, Determinants, and
Gains
Mihails Hazans
B01-03 Die Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion im rechtlichen und poli-
tischen Gefüge der Europäischen Union
Martin Seidel
2002
B30-02 An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Ass-
urance
Marcus Hagedorn, Ashok Kaul,
Tim Mennel
B29B-02 Trade Agreements as Self-protection Jennifer Pédussel Wu
B29A-02 Growth and Business Cycles with Imperfect Credit Markets Debajyoti Chakrabarty
B28-02 Inequality, Politics and Economic Growth Debajyoti Chakrabarty
B27-02 Poverty Traps and Growth in a Model of Endogenous Time
Preference
Debajyoti Chakrabarty
B26-02 Monetary Convergence and Risk Premiums in the EU Candi-
date Countries
Lucjan T. Orlowski
B25-02 Trade Policy: Institutional Vs. Economic Factors Stefan Lutz
B24-02 The Eﬀects of Quotas on Vertical Intra-industry Trade Stefan Lutz
B23-02 Legal Aspects of European Economic and Monetary Union Martin Seidel
B22-02 Der Staat als Lender of Last Resort - oder: Die Achillesverse
des Eurosystems
Otto Steiger
B21-02 Nominal and Real Stochastic Convergence Within the Tran-
sition Economies and to the European Union: Evidence from
Panel Data
Ali M. Kutan, Taner M. Yigit
B20-02 The Impact of News, Oil Prices, and International Spillovers
on Russian Fincancial Markets
Bernd Hayo, Ali M. KutanB19-02 East Germany: Transition with Uniﬁcation, Experiments and
Experiences
Jürgen von Hagen, Rolf R.
Strauch, Guntram B. Wolﬀ
B18-02 Regional Specialization and Employment Dynamics in Transi-
tion Countries
Iulia Traistaru, Guntram B. Wolﬀ
B17-02 Specialization and Growth Patterns in Border Regions of Ac-
cession Countries
Laura Resmini
B16-02 Regional Specialization and Concentration of Industrial Activity
in Accession Countries
Iulia Traistaru, Peter Nĳkamp, Si-
monetta Longhi
B15-02 Does Broad Money Matter for Interest Rate Policy? Matthias Brückner, Andreas Scha-
ber
B14-02 The Long and Short of It: Global Liberalization, Poverty and
Inequality
Christian E. Weller, Adam Hersch
B13-02 De Facto and Oﬃcial Exchange Rate Regimes in Transition
Economies
Jürgen von Hagen, Jizhong Zhou
B12-02 Argentina: The Anatomy of A Crisis Jiri Jonas
B11-02 The Eurosystem and the Art of Central Banking Gunnar Heinsohn, Otto Steiger
B10-02 National Origins of European Law: Towards an Autonomous
System of European Law?
Martin Seidel
B09-02 Monetary Policy in the Euro Area - Lessons from the First Years Volker Clausen, Bernd Hayo
B08-02 Has the Link Between the Spot and Forward Exchange Rates
Broken Down? Evidence From Rolling Cointegration Tests
Ali M. Kutan, Su Zhou
B07-02 Perspektiven der Erweiterung der Europäischen Union Martin Seidel
B06-02 Is There Asymmetry in Forward Exchange Rate Bias? Multi-
Country Evidence
Su Zhou, Ali M. Kutan
B05-02 Real and Monetary Convergence Within the European Union
and Between the European Union and Candidate Countries: A
Rolling Cointegration Approach
Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan, Su
Zhou
B04-02 Asymmetric Monetary Policy Eﬀects in EMU Volker Clausen, Bernd Hayo
B03-02 The Choice of Exchange Rate Regimes: An Empirical Analysis
for Transition Economies
Jürgen von Hagen, Jizhong Zhou
B02-02 The Euro System and the Federal Reserve System Compared:
Facts and Challenges
Karlheinz Ruckriegel, Franz Seitz
B01-02 Does Inﬂation Targeting Matter? Manfred J. M. Neumann, Jürgen
von Hagen
2001
B29-01 Is Kazakhstan Vulnerable to the Dutch Disease? Karlygash Kuralbayeva, Ali M. Ku-
tan, Michael L. Wyzan
B28-01 Political Economy of the Nice Treaty: Rebalancing the EU
Council. The Future of European Agricultural Policies
Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B27-01 Investor Panic, IMF Actions, and Emerging Stock Market Re-
turns and Volatility: A Panel Investigation
Bernd Hayo, Ali M. Kutan
B26-01 Regional Eﬀects of Terrorism on Tourism: Evidence from Three
Mediterranean Countries
Konstantinos Drakos, Ali M. Ku-
tan
B25-01 Monetary Convergence of the EU Candidates to the Euro: A
Theoretical Framework and Policy Implications
Lucjan T. Orlowski
B24-01 Disintegration and Trade Jarko and Jan Fidrmuc
B23-01 Migration and Adjustment to Shocks in Transition Economies Jan Fidrmuc
B22-01 Strategic Delegation and International Capital Taxation Matthias Brückner
B21-01 Balkan and Mediterranean Candidates for European Union
Membership: The Convergence of Their Monetary Policy With
That of the Europaen Central Bank
Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan
B20-01 An Empirical Inquiry of the Eﬃciency of Intergovernmental
Transfers for Water Projects Based on the WRDA Data
Anna Rubinchik-Pessach
B19-01 Detrending and the Money-Output Link: International Evi-
dence
R.W. Hafer, Ali M. KutanB18-01 Monetary Policy in Unknown Territory. The European Central
Bank in the Early Years
Jürgen von Hagen, Matthias
Brückner
B17-01 Executive Authority, the Personal Vote, and Budget Discipline
in Latin American and Carribean Countries
Mark Hallerberg, Patrick Marier
B16-01 Sources of Inﬂation and Output Fluctuations in Poland and
Hungary: Implications for Full Membership in the European
Union
Selahattin Dibooglu, Ali M. Kutan
B15-01 Programs Without Alternative: Public Pensions in the OECD Christian E. Weller
B14-01 Formal Fiscal Restraints and Budget Processes As Solutions to
a Deﬁcit and Spending Bias in Public Finances - U.S. Experi-
ence and Possible Lessons for EMU
Rolf R. Strauch, Jürgen von Hagen
B13-01 German Public Finances: Recent Experiences and Future Chal-
lenges
Jürgen von Hagen, Rolf R. Strauch
B12-01 The Impact of Eastern Enlargement On EU-Labour Markets.
Pensions Reform Between Economic and Political Problems
Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B11-01 Inﬂationary Performance in a Monetary Union With Large Wa-
ge Setters
Lilia Cavallar
B10-01 Integration of the Baltic States into the EU and Institutions
of Fiscal Convergence: A Critical Evaluation of Key Issues and
Empirical Evidence
Ali M. Kutan, Niina Pautola-Mol
B09-01 Democracy in Transition Economies: Grease or Sand in the
Wheels of Growth?
Jan Fidrmuc
B08-01 The Functioning of Economic Policy Coordination Jürgen von Hagen, Susanne
Mundschenk
B07-01 The Convergence of Monetary Policy Between Candidate
Countries and the European Union
Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan
B06-01 Opposites Attract: The Case of Greek and Turkish Financial
Markets
Konstantinos Drakos, Ali M. Ku-
tan
B05-01 Trade Rules and Global Governance: A Long Term Agenda.
The Future of Banking.
Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B04-01 The Determination of Unemployment Beneﬁts Rafael di Tella, Robert J. Mac-
Culloch
B03-01 Preferences Over Inﬂation and Unemployment: Evidence from
Surveys of Happiness
Rafael di Tella, Robert J. Mac-
Culloch, Andrew J. Oswald
B02-01 The Konstanz Seminar on Monetary Theory and Policy at Thir-
ty
Michele Fratianni, Jürgen von Ha-
gen
B01-01 Divided Boards: Partisanship Through Delegated Monetary Po-
licy
Etienne Farvaque, Gael Lagadec
2000
B20-00 Breakin-up a Nation, From the Inside Etienne Farvaque
B19-00 Income Dynamics and Stability in the Transition Process, ge-
neral Reﬂections applied to the Czech Republic
Jens Hölscher
B18-00 Budget Processes: Theory and Experimental Evidence Karl-Martin Ehrhart, Roy Gardner,
Jürgen von Hagen, Claudia Keser
B17-00 Rückführung der Landwirtschaftspolitik in die Verantwortung
der Mitgliedsstaaten? - Rechts- und Verfassungsfragen des Ge-
meinschaftsrechts
Martin Seidel
B16-00 The European Central Bank: Independence and Accountability Christa Randzio-Plath, Tomasso
Padoa-Schioppa
B15-00 Regional Risk Sharing and Redistribution in the German Fede-
ration
Jürgen von Hagen, Ralf Hepp
B14-00 Sources of Real Exchange Rate Fluctuations in Transition Eco-
nomies: The Case of Poland and Hungary
Selahattin Dibooglu, Ali M. Kutan
B13-00 Back to the Future: The Growth Prospects of Transition Eco-
nomies Reconsidered
Nauro F. CamposB12-00 Rechtsetzung und Rechtsangleichung als Folge der Einheitli-
chen Europäischen Währung
Martin Seidel
B11-00 A Dynamic Approach to Inﬂation Targeting in Transition Eco-
nomies
Lucjan T. Orlowski
B10-00 The Importance of Domestic Political Institutions: Why and
How Belgium Qualiﬁed for EMU
Marc Hallerberg
B09-00 Rational Institutions Yield Hysteresis Rafael Di Tella, Robert Mac-
Culloch
B08-00 The Eﬀectiveness of Self-Protection Policies for Safeguarding
Emerging Market Economies from Crises
Kenneth Kletzer
B07-00 Financial Supervision and Policy Coordination in The EMU Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B06-00 The Demand for Money in Austria Bernd Hayo
B05-00 Liberalization, Democracy and Economic Performance during
Transition
Jan Fidrmuc
B04-00 A New Political Culture in The EU - Democratic Accountability
of the ECB
Christa Randzio-Plath
B03-00 Integration, Disintegration and Trade in Europe: Evolution of
Trade Relations during the 1990’s
Jarko Fidrmuc, Jan Fidrmuc
B02-00 Inﬂation Bias and Productivity Shocks in Transition Economies:
The Case of the Czech Republic
Josef C. Barda, Arthur E. King, Ali
M. Kutan
B01-00 Monetary Union and Fiscal Federalism Kenneth Kletzer, Jürgen von Ha-
gen
1999
B26-99 Skills, Labour Costs, and Vertically Diﬀerentiated Industries: A
General Equilibrium Analysis
Stefan Lutz, Alessandro Turrini
B25-99 Micro and Macro Determinants of Public Support for Market
Reforms in Eastern Europe
Bernd Hayo
B24-99 What Makes a Revolution? Robert MacCulloch
B23-99 Informal Family Insurance and the Design of the Welfare State Rafael Di Tella, Robert Mac-
Culloch
B22-99 Partisan Social Happiness Rafael Di Tella, Robert Mac-
Culloch
B21-99 The End of Moderate Inﬂation in Three Transition Economies? Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan
B20-99 Subnational Government Bailouts in Germany Helmut Seitz
B19-99 The Evolution of Monetary Policy in Transition Economies Ali M. Kutan, Josef C. Brada
B18-99 Why are Eastern Europe’s Banks not failing when everybody
else’s are?
Christian E. Weller, Bernard Mor-
zuch
B17-99 Stability of Monetary Unions: Lessons from the Break-Up of
Czechoslovakia
Jan Fidrmuc, Julius Horvath and
Jarko Fidrmuc
B16-99 Multinational Banks and Development Finance Christian E.Weller and Mark J.
Scher
B15-99 Financial Crises after Financial Liberalization: Exceptional Cir-
cumstances or Structural Weakness?
Christian E. Weller
B14-99 Industry Eﬀects of Monetary Policy in Germany Bernd Hayo and Birgit Uhlenbrock
B13-99 Fiancial Fragility or What Went Right and What Could Go
Wrong in Central European Banking?
Christian E. Weller and Jürgen von
Hagen
B12 -99 Size Distortions of Tests of the Null Hypothesis of Stationarity:
Evidence and Implications for Applied Work
Mehmet Caner and Lutz Kilian
B11-99 Financial Supervision and Policy Coordination in the EMU Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B10-99 Financial Liberalization, Multinational Banks and Credit Sup-
ply: The Case of Poland
Christian Weller
B09-99 Monetary Policy, Parameter Uncertainty and Optimal Learning Volker Wieland
B08-99 The Connection between more Multinational Banks and less
Real Credit in Transition Economies
Christian WellerB07-99 Comovement and Catch-up in Productivity across Sectors: Evi-
dence from the OECD
Christopher M. Cornwell and Jens-
Uwe Wächter
B06-99 Productivity Convergence and Economic Growth: A Frontier
Production Function Approach
Christopher M. Cornwell and Jens-
Uwe Wächter
B05-99 Tumbling Giant: Germany‘s Experience with the Maastricht
Fiscal Criteria
Jürgen von Hagen and Rolf
Strauch
B04-99 The Finance-Investment Link in a Transition Economy: Evi-
dence for Poland from Panel Data
Christian Weller
B03-99 The Macroeconomics of Happiness Rafael Di Tella, Robert Mac-
Culloch and Andrew J. Oswald
B02-99 The Consequences of Labour Market Flexibility: Panel Evidence
Based on Survey Data
Rafael Di Tella and Robert Mac-
Culloch
B01-99 The Excess Volatility of Foreign Exchange Rates: Statistical
Puzzle or Theoretical Artifact?
Robert B.H. Hauswald
1998
B16-98 Labour Market + Tax Policy in the EMU Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B15-98 Can Taxing Foreign Competition Harm the Domestic Industry? Stefan Lutz
B14-98 Free Trade and Arms Races: Some Thoughts Regarding EU-
Russian Trade
Rafael Reuveny and John Maxwell
B13-98 Fiscal Policy and Intranational Risk-Sharing Jürgen von Hagen
B12-98 Price Stability and Monetary Policy Eﬀectiveness when Nomi-
nal Interest Rates are Bounded at Zero
Athanasios Orphanides and Volker
Wieland
B11A-98 Die Bewertung der "dauerhaft tragbaren öﬀentlichen Finanz-
lage"der EU Mitgliedstaaten beim Übergang zur dritten Stufe
der EWWU
Rolf Strauch
B11-98 Exchange Rate Regimes in the Transition Economies: Case Stu-
dy of the Czech Republic: 1990-1997
Julius Horvath and Jiri Jonas
B10-98 Der Wettbewerb der Rechts- und politischen Systeme in der
Europäischen Union
Martin Seidel
B09-98 U.S. Monetary Policy and Monetary Policy and the ESCB Robert L. Hetzel
B08-98 Money-Output Granger Causality Revisited: An Empirical Ana-
lysis of EU Countries (überarbeitete Version zum Herunterla-
den)
Bernd Hayo
B07-98 Designing Voluntary Environmental Agreements in Europe: So-
me Lessons from the U.S. EPA’s 33/50 Program
John W. Maxwell
B06-98 Monetary Union, Asymmetric Productivity Shocks and Fiscal
Insurance: an Analytical Discussion of Welfare Issues
Kenneth Kletzer
B05-98 Estimating a European Demand for Money (überarbeitete Ver-
sion zum Herunterladen)
Bernd Hayo
B04-98 The EMU’s Exchange Rate Policy Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B03-98 Central Bank Policy in a More Perfect Financial System Jürgen von Hagen / Ingo Fender
B02-98 Trade with Low-Wage Countries and Wage Inequality Jaleel Ahmad
B01-98 Budgeting Institutions for Aggregate Fiscal Discipline Jürgen von Hagen
1997
B04-97 Macroeconomic Stabilization with a Common Currency: Does
European Monetary Uniﬁcation Create a Need for Fiscal Ins-
urance or Federalism?
Kenneth Kletzer
B-03-97 Liberalising European Markets for Energy and Telecommunica-
tions: Some Lessons from the US Electric Utility Industry
Tom Lyon / John Mayo
B02-97 Employment and EMU Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B01-97 A Stability Pact for Europe (a Forum organized by ZEI)ISSN 1436 - 6053
Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung
Center for European Integration Studies
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn
Walter-Flex-Strasse 3 Tel.: +49-228-73-1732
D-53113 Bonn Fax: +49-228-73-1809
Germany www.zei.de